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It is commonplace to remark that the workload of the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals has become unmanageable. In the last
fifteen years, filings have increased more than threefold, while judge-
ships have increased only minimally.' To deal with this staggering in-
crease in workload, the courts have experimented with various
techniques. Jurisdictional contractions have been urged,2 use of a cen-
tral staff has been augmented,3 summary and screening procedures
have been instituted,4 and oral argument has been reduced or elimi-
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation
Rules in the United States Courts of.4ppeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Reynolds & Richman];
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, FJC RESEARCH SERIES No. 73-2, STANDARDS
FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS (i973) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS];
[1977] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. [hereinafter
cited as 1977 ANNUAL REPORT].
1. In fiscal 1963, 5,437 cases were filed in the courts of appeals. By 1977, the number had
increased to 19,118. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 164. In the same time period authorized judgeships
increased from 78 to 97. Id.
2. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); Friendly,
Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1974).
3. See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME
(1974); Federal Judicial Center, Central Legal Staffs in the United States Courts of Appeals: A
Survey of Internal Operating Procedures (April 1978).
4. For a careful explanation of the screening procedures used in the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, see NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d
966 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States
Courts of4ppeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
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One of the most dramatic steps taken by the courts in recent years
has been to reduce significantly the number of opinions that are pub-
lished. The movement toward limited publication began in earnest in
1971, following a report by the Federal Judicial Center.6 The report
spurred both study and action; in 1972, the Judicial Conference of the
United States requested that each circuit develop a plan to limit the
publication of opinions.7 By 1974, each circuit had such a plan.' The
effect of the plans on the practices of the courts of appeals was immedi-
ate: between 1973 and 1977, the percentage of opinions published by
the circuits fell from 48.4% to 37.2%.9
Proponents of the limited publication plans believe that limiting
publication will make it easier for the judges to accomplish their im-
portant work since time and effort will not be expended in publishing
decisions in trivial cases. The argument for limited publication rests on
three premises.' 0 The first of these is that not all appellate opinions
need to be published. This premise relies on a distinction between "law
making" opinions and "dispute-settling" opinions. Law making opin-
ions announce new law, apply settled law to new facts, or include im-
portant discussion or criticism of settled rules. Dispute-settling
opinions apply uncontroversial rules of law to ordinary cases and have
no value to the public. The second premise of the limited publication
argument is that the cost of full publication is excessive. Published
opinions, on which judges expend more time and effort, cost signifi-
cantly more to produce than do unpublished ones. Similarly, the cost
of consuming the mass of published law is high; libraries must be
larger, and research time is increased. The third and perhaps most cru-
cial premise of the argument is that the judges can determine before
writing an opinion whether it will be a "law making" opinion or simply
a "dispute-settling" one.
Many of the limited publication plans contain what might be
termed a no-citation corollary, a rule prohibiting citation to the court of
its own unpublished opinions. There are two principal arguments for
this corollary. First, many of the cost savings of limited publication are
lost if unpublished opinions may be cited. Judges must draft them
5. For a review of some of the literature concerning the need for oral argument, see 2 ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, at 2-32 (1975).
6. [1971] FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ANN. REP. 8.
7. [1972] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 33.
8. [1974] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 12-13.
9. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 3.
10. We have discussed the arguments behind the limited publication, no-citation rules in
much more detail in Reynolds & Richman. See also STANDARDS.
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more carefully, libraries must accommodate them, and lawyers must
include them in their research. Second, citation of unpublished opin-
ions produces serious unfairness since unpublished opinions are more
readily available to some lawyers than to other lawyers.
The premises of the limited publication argument are subject to
serious theoretical attack; similarly, the arguments for the no-citation
corollary are conceptually vulnerable." Empirical justification for the
factual claims of all the arguments is limited.' Further, the plans are
anything but foolproof; significant numbers of "law making" opinions
go unpublished.' 3
Powerful counterarguments have been advanced against the lim-
ited publication, no-citation plans. The plans diminish judicial respon-
sibility and accountability. Courts are more free to be arbitrary if their
past pronouncements cannot be cited to them to guide and restrict their
future action. Review of the courts' work by the United States
Supreme Court, the bar, and the academic community is hampered by
limited access to all of the courts' opinions."
Full exposure and consideration of the arguments reveal that
neither the case for nor the case against limited publication is conclu-
sive. Instead, the arguments on each side have considerable merit, and
a verdict on the plans requires an evaluation of the trade-offs that are
in fact made, an evaluation based on empirical study of experience
under the plans.
Because the limited publication, no-citation schemes represent a
marked change in the operations of the courts of appeals, it is some-
what surprising that the judicial establishment has not undertaken a
thorough empirical investigation. 5 There have been studies from
outside the judiciary, but they have mainly been surveys of the unpub-
lished products of a particular court in search of opinions that arguably
should have been reported.' 6 Although those studies show that such
11. See Reynolds & Richman 1194-1204.
12. Id. 1206.
13. In addition, inconsistencies have appeared among published and unpublished opinions.
For examples of inconsistencies and suppressed precedent in the federal circuit courts, see Gard-
ner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: DenialofEqualJustice?, 61 A.B.A.J. 1224, 1225 (1975);
Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law. The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 309 (1977). These phenomena have also been observed in the opinions of state
courts that have adopted limited publication plans. See Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opin-
ion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386 (1973); Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and
the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REv. 37, 48-56 (1978).
14. See Reynolds & Richmnan 1200.
15. There is one limited study but it has received little distribution. See Remarks of John P.
Frank Before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 29, 1976).
16. See id. and authorities cited in note 13 supra.
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opinions do exist, there remain a number of significant questions that
can be answered only by systematic investigation. Are there important
opinions that go unreported? In addition, are there cases that might
have generated important opinions but for an early decision not to
publish? Are the circuits following their nonpublication rules? How
does the reversal rate in unpublished opinions compare with that in
published opinions? What of dissents in unpublished opinions? What
types of cases typically result in unpublished decisions? What role does
judicial support staff play in producing unpublished opinions?
This Article will address some of these questions. Since the rules
of the circuits vary in scope and detail, it is important to examine the
effect of the individual variations. Accordingly, we have chosen to ex-
amine the experience of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits because these
courts take significantly different approaches to the limited publication,
no-citation problem. To put the study on a systematic basis, we have
confined our investigation to an examination of all the opinions-pub-
lished and unpublished-that were produced by the respective courts
during the time necessary for those courts to render two hundred un-
published opinions.
I. THE PLANS
As discussed above,17 the chief goal of limited publication plans is
judicial efficiency. The main criticisms of the plans center on the possi-
bility of judicial error, judicial irresponsibility, and lack of judicial ac-
countability. Recognizing these competing considerations, it is clear
that the objective of a limited publication plan ought to be to promote
efficient use of judicial resources while minimizing the risks of errors in
classification, of judicial irresponsibility, and of judicial unac-
countability. The circuits have not adopted identical strategies toward
the ultimate end. The plans of some circuits have stressed the goals of
the limited publication program, while the plans of others have focused
on avoiding the possible dangers. For convenience, the former, of
which the Sixth Circuit is a good example, may be called "radical"
limited publication plans; the latter, of which the Fourth Circuit is a
sample, will be called "conservative" plans.
The difference between the Fourth and Sixth Circuit approaches is
clearly demonstrated by their different treatment of criteria for publica-
tion.'I Both plans provide for publication of any decision of an appeal
17. See text accompanying notes 1-9 supra.
18. For a general discussion of the rules in the various circuits, see Reynolds & Richman
1173-81. An abbreviated discussion is available in Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States
Courts af(Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 128, 129-35 (1977).
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of a proceeding that was reported below.'9 The rationale for this provi-
sion is quite clear. The bar uses reported opinions of district courts and
administrative agencies for guidance in planning and prediction. Any
review of a reported decision should be published so that the readers of
the initial decision will know if it has been reversed or affirmed upon a
different rationale. Publication assures that readers will not be misled
by reliance upon the reported decision of the initial tribunal.
Aside from this common feature, the two plans have radically dif-
ferent criteria for publication. The Sixth Circuit Plan's entire statement
on the matter reads as follows: "[I]t is the policy of this court to publish
only those opinions which are considered to be of precedential
value."'2 This standard---"precedential value"-gives the individual
judges unfettered discretion. The Sixth Circuit Plan, in this instance,
can clearly be classed among the radical limited publication plans,2' for
it has not attempted to elucidate criteria to control the publication deci-
sion. By providing the deciding panel with this leeway, the Sixth Cir-
cuit seeks to accomplish the economies of limited publication
seemingly without great concern for a major potential drawback-the
danger of important decisions going unreported.22
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Plan provides the judges detailed
criteria to use when deciding whether to publish an opinion. An opin-
ion shall not be published unless it satisfies one of the following crite-
ria:
(i) It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law
within this circuit; or
(ii) It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
(iii) It criticizes existing law; or
(iv) It contains an historical review of a legal rule that is not dupli-
cative; or
(v) It resolves a conflict between panels of this court, or creates a
conflict with a decision in another circuit; or
(vi) It is in a case in which there is a published opinion below.23
19. 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(vi); Proposed Plan of United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit Concerning the Publication of Opinions, which along with the Publication Plans of all the
other circuits, is contained in appendix C of J. SPANIOL, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF CIRCUIT
OPINION PUBLICATION PLANS FOR 1977 (1977). Mr. Spaniol is the Deputy Director of the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts. He prepared similar reports for the years 1973-76. All
other plans not incorporated in the circuits' local rules are referred to hereinafter as Circuit Plan.
20. Sixth Circuit Plan, supra note 19, 1 2.
21. Other circuits have 'imilarly general standards: see 1ST CIR. R. app. B, (a); 2D CIR. R.
0.23; Third Circuit Plan, supra note 19, (1); 5TH CIR. R. 21.
22. The practice of providing only general criteria for publication has been widely criticized.
See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 36 (1976); Reynolds &
Richman 1176-77; Note, supra note 18, at 132.
23. 4TH CIR. R. 18(a). Several other circuits have adopted the approach of providing de-
tailed publication criteria. See District of Columbia Plan, supra note 19, at 2; 7TH CIR. R. 35(c);
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These standards elaborate the views of the court as a whole on the
question of when its "law making" or institutional function, as opposed
to its purely "dispute-settling" function, is implicated. The more de-
tailed criteria should result in fewer errors of omission-fewer in-
stances of "law making" cases going unpublished. Concern for
avoiding these errors of omission indicates that the Fourth Circuit has
chosen what has been designated the conservative approach to limited
publication.24
With regard to who makes the decision to publish, the Sixth Cir-
cuit Plan is plainly more radical than that of the Fourth. The Sixth
Circuit Plan provides: "No opinion of the court shall be published in
the Federal Reporter except when authorized by the affirmative vote of
the majority ofjudges participating in the decision.12 5 The Fourth Cir-
cuit Plan, on the other hand, lessens the likelihood that a significant
opinion will go unpublished, by permitting a positive publication deci-
sion from either the author of an opinion or the majority of judges
joining in it.26
The most controversial features of the circuits' limited publication
plans have been the no-citation provisions.2 As noted earlier these
provisions are designed to accomplish two ends. First, they seek to
safeguard the economies generated by the limited publication plans;
the courts fear that if unpublished opinions can be cited, economies of
production and consumption will disappear.28 Second, they aim to
avoid the unfairness of unequal access; proponents of the rules feared
8TH CIR. R. app. 4; 9TH CIR. R. 2 1(b). These criteria are all basically descendants of a list of
criteria originally suggested by the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice in STANDARDS.
24. This more cautious approach of providing detailed criteria for publication has won the
approval of several commentators. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 22, at 36; Reynolds &
Richman 1176-77.
25. Sixth Circuit Plan, supra note 19, T 2.
26. Both plans create a presumption against publication. The Fourth Circuit Plan provides
that "fain opinion shall not be published unless it meets one of the following standards for publi-
cation." 4TH CIR. R. 18(a). The Sixth Circuit Plan enunciates that "it is the policy of this court to
publish only those opinions which are considered to be of precedential value." Sixth Circuit Plan,
spra note 19, % 2.
27. The no-citation provisions have been viewed by some as the sine qua non for success of
the whole limited publication regime.
The Commission is, of course, aware of the problems which result from non-publi-
cation. Perhaps the thorniest involves the question whether or not to allow unpublished
opinions to be cited as precedent. To allow litigants to cite opinions which the court has
designated as "not for publication" invites publication by private publishers, thus defeat-
ing the basic purpose of the program.
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND IN-
TERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 51 (1975). See also Seligson & Warn-
lof, The Use of Unreported Cases in Caifornia, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37, 51-54 (1972). Others have
regarded no-citation rules as a threat to the entire tradition of common law judging. See, e.g.,
Kanner, supra note 13, at 445; Note, supra note 18, at 146; Comment, supra note 13, at 339-40.
28. See STANDARDS 19.
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that some lawyers would have greater access to unpublished opinions
than would others.2 9 No-citation rules create several problems, how-
ever, chief among which is the danger of judicial irresponsibility. One
of the principal controls over common law judges is the requirement
that what they say today be consistent with what they said yesterday.
The no-citation provisions remove that constraint.
The Sixth Circuit's approach to the question of citation is the most
stringent among the circuits. Local Rule 1130 flatly forbids citation of
unpublished opinions to the court:
Decisions of this court designated as not for publication should
never be cited to this court or in any material prepared for this court.
No such decision should be published by any publisher unless this
rule is quoted at a prominent place on the first page of the decision so
published.31
The Fourth Circuit's position is considerably more cautious. The court
will not cite its own unpublished opinions "[i]n the absence of unusual
circumstances,"3 and has indicated that the citation of those opinions
to the court is disfavored.33 Citation is, however, permitted with appro-
priate safeguards:
If counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition
has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case and
that there is no published opinion that would serve as well, such dis-
position may be cited if counsel serves a copy thereof on all other
parties in the case and on the court.34
Related to the rules against citation of unpublished opinions are
the circulation rules, which limit access to the unpublished opinions in
the first place. The arguments for and against circulation roughly par-
allel the arguments concerning citation. The prohibition of circulation,
it is argued, preserves the economies of limited publication and reduces
the problem of unequal access. 35
29. Id.
30. 6TH CIR. R. 11.
31. Id.
32. 4TH CIR. R. 18(d)(i).
33. Id. 18(d)(ii). An exception is made if citation is for the purpose of establishing res judi-
cata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
34. Id. 18(d)(iii).
35. In many cases, distribution only to the parties-a provision included in each plan-is
sufficient to produce a serious problem of unequal access. For example, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice is a party in every criminal case in the federal courts. Circulation and discussion
of unpublished opinions within the Department is not unlikely; the result is that the prosecution
always will have access to the courts' unpublished products while the defense rarely will have
access. Similar types of informal circulation could easily be accomplished by other habitual liti-
gants-legal aid, trade associations, or the public defenders' offices.
The Tenth Circuit has adopted measures to alleviate even this inequality. It prepares a bian-
nual subject matter digest of its unpublished opinions. Anyone may subscribe to the index at the
Vol. 1979:807]
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Predictably, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have taken opposite
stands on the question of circulation. The Sixth Circuit does not rou-
tinely circulate unpublished opinions; in the typical case, only counsel
and the district court or administrative agency below receive copies of
the decision.36 The Forrth Circuit, by contrast, circulates unpublished
opinions "on a subscription basis upon the payment of a reasonable fee
* ." to anyone who wishes to receive them.
3 7
These plans are the formal criteria established to guide the judges
in deciding whether to publish a particular opinion. The Fourth and
Sixth Circuit Plans take different paths with respect to their content.
The question then is, has either plan succeeded in promoting the effi-
cient use of judicial resources while mininizing the risks inherent in
nonpublication and noncitation? Have the plans worked?
II. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 3 8
A. Published Versus Unpublished-Relative Percentages.
We might expect a conservative plan to generate a high ratio of
published to unpublished opinions, since, by hypothesis, a conservative
plan reflects more concern for the dangers of limited publication and,
therefore, should result in fewer nonpublication decisions. Conversely,
annual rate of $5.00. Approximately 60 law libraries in the circuit have been designated deposito-
ries for the index. Letter from Emory G. Hatcher, Circuit Executive, United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to William M. Richman (Aug. 24, 1977).
36. Letter from James A. Higgins, Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, to William M. Richman (Aug. 30, 1977). Mr. Higgins indicates, however, that on
occasion "unpublished opinions are designated for distribution to all circuit and district judges in
the circuit for information purposes." Id.
37. 4TH CIR. R. 18(c)(ii).
38. The burden under which the courts work, see, e.g., Reynolds & Richman 1167-68 and
authorities cited therein, can be seen from our survey. For the Fourth Circuit, we used a study
period of January 1, 1978, to March 1, 1978, a span containing approximately 40 working days.
The study period for the Sixth Circuit was January 1, 1978, to April 18, 1978-approximately 80
working days. (The sample period for each circuit was picked simply by choosing that amount of
time necessary for the court to produce 200 unpublished opinions.) The Fourth Circuit produced
200 unpublished and 45 published opinions - a total of 245 cases decided after submission or
argument. Since the judges generally sit in panels of three, that figure must be multiplied by three
in order to determine the total number ofjudicial votes cast to decide the 245 cases; hence, there
were 735 votes cast during the two months studied. Seven authorized judgeships and 40 working
days indicate that the total number ofjudge-days during the test period was 280. Simple division
shows that each active judge on the Fourth Circuit must have decided more than two and one-half
cases per day.
The situation in the Sixth Circuit is somewhat less pressing, but still overwhelming. In the
80-day study period, that court disposed of 95 cases by published opinion and 200 cases by
unpublished opinion. Thus there were 885 votes. Nine judges and 80 workdays yields 720 judge-
days; each judge must have prepared an average of 1.5 decisions each day. This figure, although
lower than that in the Fourth Circuit, is still far from bptimum.
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a radical plan should generate a relatively low ratio of published to
unpublished opinions since it demonstrates more concern with achiev-
ing the goals of limited publication.39
The trend observable in the available data40 suggests this hypothe-
sis is invalid. In every year except 1976,at the Sixth Circuit, which has
the radical plan, has produced a higher ratio of published to unpub-
lished decisions than has the Fourth Circuit. The following table illus-
trates the data.42
TABLE 143
PUBLICATION/NONPUBLICATION DATA
Fourth Circuit Sixth Circuit
Number of Number of
Opinions Opinions
1978 Published 45 97
(Sample period) Unpublished 200 200
1977 Published 209 199
Unpublished 777 546
1976 Published 365 270
Unpublished 586 636
1975 Published 298 388
Unpublished 839 563
1974 Published 295 340
Unpublished 864 532
One explanation for this result is that the Fourth Circuit has a
significantly greater volume of state prisoner litigation than does the
Sixth. In the Fourth Circuit in 1977, prisoner cases accounted for
nearly a quarter of the entire appellate docket, while in the Sixth Cir-
39. See text acompanying note 16 supra.
40. The available data consist of the annual reports made by Joseph F. Spaniol, Executive
Assistant to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, on the perform-
ance of the eleven circuit courts under their limited publication plans. See note 19 supra. The
relevant portion of each report is Appendix A, in which Mr. Spaniol has tabulated the number of
dispositions by each circuit by published opinion, by unpublished opinion, and by order. The
data for 1978 were compiled by the authors by actual count of the opinions of each circuit.
It should be noted that the Fourth Circuit records no dispositions by order, while the Sixth
Circuit records a substantial number by that method. This difference turns out to be largely se-
mantic. The Sixth Circuit distinguishes between unpublished opinions and orders. Unpublished
opinions are typically longer and contain more of the facts of the case and a more complete
statement of the holding and rationale. The Fourth Circuit does not make this distinction among
its unpublished products. For the sake of uniformity, we will refer to all unpublished dispositions
of both circuits as "unpublished opinions."
41. There is no readily apparent explanation for this exception.
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cuit the percentage was just below ten.' Prisoner cases are perceived
by many to be repetitive and unenlightening;4 5 the Fourth Circuit's
high volume of prisoner litigation may be responsible for the unexpect-
edly low ratio of published to unpublished opinions.46
Another possible explanation, one that tends to undermine the
radical/conservative classification system, is that the system itself is
simply what Karl Llewellyn would call a "paper rule"-a seemingly
rational generalization that is in fact nonpredictive.4 7 Of course, it is
also possible that factors unrelated to the criteria for publication influ-
ence the percentage of opinions actually published.48
B. Qualiy.
A major goal of limited publication plans is to restrict the amount
42. A graph might make the data more intelligible. The vertical axis in the graph below
represents percentage of opinions published, the horizontal axis the year in question.
Opinions Published
40% 6 -6
- 6
307o 6
4
20%
10%
78 77 76 75 74
6 Sixth Circuit
4 Fourth Circuit
43. See note 40 supra.
44. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 174 Fig. 1.
45. See sources cited in note 125 infra.
46. See Table VII and text accompanying notes 123-29 infra for a subject matter breakdown
of the unpublished and published opinions of the two circuits.
47. See Llewellyn, 4 Realistic Juriorudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. RE. 431, 447-53
(1930).
48. The possible variables are numerous. One that comes to mind most readily is relative
workload. In 1977, the Fourth Circuit disposed of 237 appeals for each of seven active judgeships;
the Sixth Circuit disposed of 203 appeals for each of nine active judgeships. J. SPANIOL, REPORT,
supra note 19. The difference in workload could well account for significant pressure against
publication. Another possible factor is the attitude of the judges toward nonpubication. While
the Fourth Circuit's rule appears more conservative, it may be that the Fourth Circuit's judges are
more enthusiastic about the benefits of nonpublication than are their fellow judges in the Sixth
Circuit.
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of judicial time devoted to writing opinions. We should expect unpub-
lished opinions, therefore, to be relatively short. The data in Table II
confirm this hypothesis: over eighty percent of the unpublished opin-
ions in each circuit were shorter than two pages.
TABLE II
LENGTH49 OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
(percentages)
Number of more
pages or less -1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-6 6-8 than 8
Fourth Circuit 56 13.5- 17 5.5 3.5 3 1 .5
Sixth Circuit 40 24 27 5.5 1 1.5 .5 .5
Since those opinions are considerably shorter than their published
counterparts,50 it would seem that substantial time savings have been
effected in both circuits. 5'
Less clear, however, is the price paid to save the time. The data
from the sample seem to indicate that the circuits are not suppressing
many opinions that, as drafted, would be a valuable addition to legal
literature. The traditional question raised with regard to nonpublica-
tion is, how many opinions that do make new law will be suppressed?
This could well be the wrong question to ask. Given the excessive
brevity of many of the opinions, the proper question to ask is, how
many cases might have generated precedential opinions had they not
been handled in so cursory a fashion? An opinion that in effect reads:
"The court is familiar with the facts of this case and the contentions of
the petitioner and finds them to be without merit," surely should not be
published. The question is, rather, should the case have generated an
opinion concerning one of those contentions that would have been wor-
49. Length was measured by the number of pages of text (not including the caption); in both
circuits the opinions are issued on 8 1/2 by I 1 inch paper. The reference to pages may be a bit
misleading, for neither court crams a great many words on a page. An unpublished opinion in the
Fourth Circuit contains between 160 and 180 words per page. The Sixth Circuit pages generally
contain about 225 words, being printed with a different typeface. Table II is based on an approxi-
mation of Sixth Circuit pages "equivalent" to Fourth Circuit pages.
50. The data below show the mean number of words in the opinions issued during the study
period (data for unpublished opinions based on sampling of half).
Published Unpublished
Fourth Circuit 1663 145
Sixth Circuit 1724 229
Another way of illustrating the extreme brevity of unpublished opinions is by noting that less than
20% of the published opinions were shorter than 300 words, but over 80% of the unpublished
opinions were shorter than 300 words.
51. It is arguable that, considering the nature of the cases in which opinions are not pub-
lished, opinions in these cases would be rather short even if they were published. This argument
suggests that the judicial time saved is not as great as imagined.
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thy of publication? An excessively short52 opinion raises the possibility
of judicial irresponsibility: is a panel (or a single judge) that produces a
one sentence decision doing its job properly?
Reflection upon the purposes served by an appellate opinion helps
answer that question. An opinion has several possible objectives: to
advise the litigants and the tribunal below of the disposition and the
reasons for that decision (the "dispute-settling" function), to provide a
basis for review by a higher court, and to establish or reinforce legal
rules (the "law making" function). 3 The limited publication plans ex-
pressly abrogate the last of those goals, so the relevant inquiry is
whether unpublished opinions adequately perform the first two func-
tions. Many authorities have commented, with a good deal of agree-
ment, on the minimum standards necessary for an opinion to serve
those functions adequately. The American Bar Association, for exam-
ple, recommends that
[e]very decision should be supported, at minimum, by a citation of
the authority or statement of grounds upon which it is based. When
the lower court decision was based on a written opinion that ade-
quately expresses the appellate court's view of the law, the reviewing
court should incorporate that opinion or such portions of it as are
deemed pertinent, or, if it has been published, affirm on the basis of
that opinion.54
52. A lengthy unpublished opinion raises a different concern, that of suppressed precedent.
"Important" opinions-those that should be published-generally require more factual exposition
and more carefully explained reasoning. All of this requires more words, so the existence of any
lengthy unpublished opinions is a possible source of worry. Examination of the longer opinions
from both circuits relieves this anxiety. In most cases, the lengthy opinions contain an unusually
long recitation of facts as a prelude to application of well-settled law, e.g., United States v. Stacy,
No. 77-1827 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1978) (lengthy recitation of facts that led the district court to revoke
appellant's probation), or an extensive quotation from statutory materials, e.g., Pannell v.
Califano, No. 77-2095 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1978) (quoting at length from regulations relevant to a
"black lung" case).
53. The phrases are from Leflar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 319 (1971).
54. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 58 (1977). Karl Llewellyn said much the same thing in his own
style:
The deciding is, in the main, done under felt pressure or even compulsion to follow
up with a published "opinion" which tells any interested person what the cause is and
why the decision-under the authorities-is right, and perhaps why it is wise.
This opinion is addressed also to the losing party and counsel in an effort to make
them feel at least that they have had a fair break ....
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 26 (1960). See also JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra
note 22 (discussing the most abbreviated type of opinion, the "memorandum decision"):
It is essential that the memorandum decision convey at least three elements: (I) the
identity of the case that the judges were deciding; (2) the ultimate result or disposition;
(3) the reasons for the result. In addition, it is often desirable that the issues-or the
appellant's contentions-be explicitly stated.
Id. 34.
One survey of attorneys found that more than two-thirds of the respondents believed that
LIMITED PUBLICATION
Unfortunately, as shown in Table III, a large percentage of the unpub-
lished opinions in both circuits fail to satisfy even that minimum stan-
dard. An opinion was categorized as a "Reasoned Opinion" if the
opinion gave some indication of what the case was about, and some
reason for the disposition, even if only a citation to precedent. On the
other hand, an opinion stating only that there were no grounds for re-
versal, that the appeal was frivolous, that the court below had not
abused its discretion, or that there was substantial evidence to convict,
did not satisfy minimum standards.
TABLE 11156
SATISFACTION OF MINIMUM STANDARDS
(percentages)
"Minimum
Standards" Cases Decided Decisions with
Reasoned on Basis of No Discernible
Opinions Opinion Below Justification
Fourth Circuit 42 42 16
Sixth Circuit 52 14 34
Over a quarter of the four hundred cases examined fell into the
second category, "affirmed on the basis of the decision below." Al-
though that procedure does not satisfy the ABA Minimum Standards, 7
"the due process clause of the Constitution should be held to require courts of appeals to write 'at
least a brief statement of the reasons for their decisions.'" COMMISSION ON REvIsION, supra note
27, at 49.
55. Decision only by citation to precedent was fairly frequent. That practice is also satisfac-
tory, since the grounds for the decision can reasonably be inferred from the cited case-at least if
there has been an adequate statement of facts in the case at bar. An opinion was also classified as
"Reasoned" if there was a dissent or concurrence that provided a basis for understanding what the
court had done. Such an opinion seems sufficient to demonstrate the majority's reasoning orjusti-
fication.
As Table III shows, see text accompanying note 56 infra, the Fourth Circuit had three times
as many decisions by reference to the opinion below as did the Sixth. No explanation for this
phenomenon comes to mind; certainly no hypothesis based on the content of the limited publica-
tion plans seems tenable. It may simply be that some judges-not all-in the Fourth Circuit have
a preference for this type of opinion.
56. The data in Table III were compiled by one of the authors on the basis of all 400 opin-
ions. The reliability of coding the opinions in the three categories listed in this text was estab-
lished by the following method: the coding in the text was done by one author; the other author,
using the textual description of the coding method, applied it to 50 randomly selected opinions
from each circuit. We agreed on the coding of 46 of the 50 opinions in the Fourth Circuit and 48
of the 50 in the Sixth.
57. The ABA Minimum Standards are satisfied if the decision below was published. See
note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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it does provide some basis upon which to review the decision. 8 Be-
cause the litigants are the ones most likely to be aware of the issues in
the case-and most interested in their resolution-the "decision by ref-
erence" also serves as some check upon possible arbitrary behavior on
review. That check is limited, however, to those who may have access
to the opinion of the court below, perhaps a very small group. Further,
a "decision by reference" does not assuage the uneasy feeling that the
court has not thought carefully about the case and its reason for believ-
ing that the ,court or agency below handled it adequately. If the court
were to explain in its own language, however briefly, its reasons for
affirmance, it might help assure that proper attention had been given to
the appeal. 9
The third category in Table III, "Decisions with No Discernible
Justification," is the most disturbing category. An example of imper-
missible brevity is Gray v. Devine.6 0 The entire opinion in that case is:
"PER CURIAM:
After consideration of the briefs, the oral argument and the rec-
ord, we see no reversible error.
AFFIRMED. 61
The opinion takes sixteen words to say what could be said in one: "Af-
firmed." We sympathize with the courts that issue such decisions; they
are overworked, 62 and a great many appeals are frivolous. Nonethe-
less, opinions such as Gray v. Devine give cause for concern for the
quality of the court's work. Consider a conclusory affirmance of a
criminal conviction challenged for lack of sufficient evidence to support
the verdict. Instead of baldly concluding that the evidence was suffi-
cient, the court could have taken time to identify references in the tran-
script to the crucial eyewitness testimony,63 to give a signal to the
58. The Supreme Court will have a basis for review if the tribunal from which the appeal was
taken to a circuit court has sufficiently articulated the factual and legal issues.
59. See R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1961), for a thorough analysis of the
benefits of the justification process.
60. No. 76-1630 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1978).
61. Id.
62. See note 38 supra.
63. The example is hypothetical, but could have been the situation in any number of such
affirmances. Williams v. United States Dist. Court, No. 77-3577 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1978), provides
another example. In that case, the court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the
district court to rule upon pending motions on the ground that "the Court does not find the peti-
tion to allege such circumstances to warrant the extraordinary relief sought." Id. The court also
referred to a Supreme Court decision that had stated the same general proposition. The court in
Williams could have explained briefly why mandamus was not appropriate: perhaps the motions
were complex, or the district judge had been ill. To pass on the petition the court had to make
such an inquiry; there is no reason why it could not have elucidated the basis of its decision.
An example of more responsible behavior is Moore v. Mathews, No. 76-1951 (6th Cir. Feb. 8,
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litigants and to the tribunal below that the court had examined the case
and had been cognizant of what transpired below. Further, it would
have provided a basis for review. A court's assurance that it "has stud-
ied the record and is fully advised in the premises,"' says, in effect,
"trust me." A court should do better than that.
Opinions that do not reveal any basis for the decision do not differ
in effect from the practice in several circuits of issuing Judgment Or-
ders. Common in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits,65 the Judg-
ment Order is a one-word decision--"Affirmed"-that does not
purport to be an opinion. The Judgment Order procedure has been
widely criticized for failing to provide even the most minimal explana-
tion of the court's decision.66 Neither the Fourth nor the Sixth Circuit
provides in its local rules for the Judgment Order practice, but many of
the opinions examined cannot be distinguished from such orders. In
fact, when an excessively truncated or conclusory opinion is coupled
with the absence of oral argument and a no-citation rule, the result is
indistinguishable in appearance and effect from a denial of certiorari-
a strange position for a court with mandatory appellate jurisdiction.67
The failure of sixteen percent of the Fourth and thirty-four percent
of the Sixth68 Circuit cases to provide any basis for the decision gives
rise to concern for the effect of limited publication rules on the quality
of a court's work. To put it another way, when the number of no-basis
decisions and reference-only decisions was combined, fewer than half
the opinions we examined gave the appearance that justice was being
done; if that result is a function of limited publication rules, then very
careful thought must be given to whether the game is worth that partic-
ular candle.
C. Reversals.
The core notion behind the movement toward limited publication
is that many judicial opinions do not merit publication. They are
straightforward applications of settled law to garden variety facts. Ac-
cordingly, they serve only to settle the dispute between the parties and
1978), in which the court quoted from the testimony of a pathologist to support an affirmance that
plaintiffs husband had not been totally disabled just prior to his death. Id. at 2.
64. E.g., Soefker v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 76-2295 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1978).
65. See Reynolds & Richman 1173-74.
66. See id. 1174-75.
67. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
68. The higher percentage of opinions that failed to provide any basis for the decision in the
Sixth Circuit does not necessarily suggest less care by that court. The Fourth Circuit, had it not
made so many decisions by reference, might have had a comparable figure. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit had more opinions that satisfied minimum standards.
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are of no interest to the bench, the bar, or the public.
Whether this basic premise can justify nonpublication when the
court of appeals reverses a district court or an administrative agency
decision is problematic because reversals are inherently interesting: by
definition, something has gone wrong.69 The interest in the phenome-
non of reversal suggests three hypotheses: first, that the reversal rate in
unpublished opinions would be lower than that in published opinions;
second, that most reversals would be published; and third, considering
the radical/conservative dichotomy, that the reversal rate in the unpub-
lished opinions of the Fourth Circuit would be lower than that in the
Sixth Circuit. The data confirm all three hypotheses.7 °
TABLE IV
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVERSALS
Total Published Number Percentage
Orders & Opinions 45 100
Affirmances 32 71.1
Reversals 13 28.9
Total Unpublished
Orders & Opinions 200 100
Affirmed 192 96
Reversed 8 4
Combined Published or Unpublished
245 100
Affirmed 224 91.4
Reversed 21 8.6
69. From the point of view of the legal formalist, for example, the law can be regarded as a
closed logical system in which correct legal decisions can be deduced from clear predetermined
legal rules. See Hart, Positivism andthe Separation of Law andMorals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 601
n.25, 608 (1958). See also R. DIAs, JURISPRUDENCE 451 (4th ed. 1976). The reversal is interesting
because it shows that the "rule," the major premise of the legal syllogism, may not be as clear as it
should be. Equally interesting is the alternative explanation of a reversal, that the district court or
administrative agency simply made an elementary error. Elementary errors by the primary deci-
sionmakers in the federal judicial system also merit attention.
To the legal realist, the law is not an algorithm for deducing results from the facts and clear
legal rules. Rather the decision results from the judge's "hunch," see, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930), pt. 1, ch. 12; Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929), or from his "situational sense," K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 54, at 121, and the opinion is the judicial advocate's argument for the
decision reached. From this point of view, the reversal may be more interesting still, since it may
reflect the fact that the sonorous generalizations intoned by appellate courts are inadequate to deal
with the facts daily encountered by the trial judge.
70. The X2 in each hypothesis is, respectively, with I d.f.: 41.688, 1.8947, 8.696. Each is
significant at the 95% level.
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TABLE V
SIXTH CIRCUIT REVERSALS
Total Published Number Percentage
Orders & Opinions 97 100
Affirmed 66 68
Reversed 31 32
Total Unpublished
Orders & Opinions 200 100
Affirmed 176 88
Reversed 24 12
Combined Published or Unpublished
297 100
Affirmed 242 81.5
Reversed 55 18.5
Tables IV and V strongly support the first hypothesis: the unpublished
opinions of both circuits show a low percentage of reversal; that is,
most reversals are published. In the Fourth Circuit the reversal rate in
published opinions (28.9%) is over seven times as great as is the reversal
rate in unpublished opinions (4%). In the Sixth Circuit the percentages
are somewhat closer (32% reversal rate in published opinions, 12% re-
versal rate in unpublished opinions), but the ratio is still nearly three to
one.
Support for the second hypothesis, that most reversals would be
published, is less apparent; thirty-eight percent of the reversals in the
Fourth Circuit and forty-three percent of those in the Sixth Circuit are
unpublished. The most plausible explanation of those somewhat high
figures is a high rate of reversal for elementary error. If this explana-
tion is the correct one, it is information that should be shared with the
public.
The third hypothesis is more problematic. The Fourth Circuit's
conservative publication plan would be expected to generate a smaller
percentage of unpublished reversals than would the Sixth Circuit's rad-
ical plan. The data seem to support the hypothesis. Only four percent
of the Fourth Circuit's unpublished opinions were reversals while the
corresponding figure for the Sixth Circuit is twelve percent. The infer-
ence that the hypothesis is correct can only be tentative, however, since
the overall reversal rate (including both published and unpublished
824 DUKE L4W JO URNAL [Vol. 1979:807
opinions) is significantly higher in the Sixth Circuit than in the Fourth
(18.5% as against 8.6%). 71 The Sixth Circuit's higher reversal rate in
unpublished opinions may simply reflect its higher overall reversal rate
and not the failure of its publication plan to select reversals for publica-
tion.
A serious question posed by these data, and by the very nature of
the phenomenon of reversal, is whether all reversals should be pub-
lished. A survey of the unpublished reversals of the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits indicates that publication of some of these opinions would
clearly serve no purpose. Among them are cases in which an event-a
change in the relevant facts or the appropriate legal standard-subse-
quent to the district court's decision required reversal. Consider Ruth-
erford v. Blankenshp.72 In that case the district court entered an order
dismissing Rutherford's petition for habeas corpus relief because Ruth-
erford had failed to exhaust all his available state remedies.73 Two
days later the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Rutherford's petition
for state habeas corpus relief-his last available state court remedy.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded the case for consideration in light of the altered facts.
Publication of such an opinion would serve no real purpose; it does not
reveal any interesting development in the law, nor even an interesting
or controversial error by the district court.74
71. The reversal rates for both circuits were tabulated by counting as an afflirmance any deci-
sion that is a partial affirmance and partial reversal. This procedure was followed because it is the
one used by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See 1977 ANNUAL REPORT
175. Isolating the partial affirmances changes the percentages somewhat, but not a great deal.
During the study period, the Fourth Circuit produced 13 partial affirmances--6 published, 7 un-
published; the Sixth Circuit produced 9 partial affirmances-5 published, 4 unpublished.
Adding these figures to the reversals for each circuit, it is possible to generate "nonaf-
firmance" rates. The nonaffirmance rate in the Fourth Circuit is 42% among published opinions
and 7.5% among unpublished opinions. In the Sixth Circuit the nonaffirmance rate is 37% among
published opinions and 14% among unpublished opinions.
The reversal rates are within the approximate range of reversal rates typically noted for the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal in 1976. See id.
72. No. 78-6050 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1978).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976); see generally Wells, Habeas Corpus and Freedom of Speech,
1978 DUKE L.J. 1307, 1335-37.
74. A similar case is Sloan v. Mathews, No. 76-2628 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 1978), in which plain-
tiffihad been denied benefits that he claimed under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 901-941 (1976). The denial of benefits by the Administrative Law Judge, the Secretary, and the
district court occurred prior to the Sixth Circuit's holding in Ansel v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 304
(6th Cir. 1976), in which the standards of proof of black lung disease were changed. This change
in the applicable standard of proof required reversal for factual determinations based upon the
new test. See also Dayton Malleable Iron Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 3664, No. 76-2011
(6th Cir. Mar. 20, 1978) in which the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's civil contempt
citation of a local union. After the district court's ruling, but before the decision on appeal, the
Sixth Circuit decided Peabody Coal Co. v. Local 1734, UMW, 543 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
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Another group of cases, which probably deserves no general dis-
semination, consists of those cases in which the appellate court dis-
agrees with the tribunal below concerning inferences to be drawn from
the facts. In Davis v. Mathews,75 for example, the Secretary of HEW
determined that a miner's widow was not entitled to black lung bene-
fits. His ruling, with which the district court agreed, was based on the
finding that the miner was not totally disabled at the time of his death.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the evidence before the Secretary and the
district court and came to the opposite conclusion. The appellate court
did not find fault with the district court's standard for review of admin-
istrative rulings (substantial evidence), but simply disagreed with the
lower court that the test had been met.76 Upon the same facts, the ap-
pellate court made the inference of total disability, while the Secretary
and the district court did not.
A more troublesome kind of reversal occurs when the district court
has made a trivial and perhaps embarrassing error. In Kendall v.
Zahradnick,77 a pro se prisoner civil rights action, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of the correctional officers' summary
judgment motion. Three years before Kendall, in Roseboro v. Garri-
son,7 8 the Fourth Circuit had held that summary judgment is inappro-
priate unless the prisoner has been "advised of his right to file counter-
affidavits or other responsive material and alerted to the fact that his
failure to so respond might result in the entry of summary judgment
against him." 79 In Kendall, the district court failed to send the required
notification. In United States v. Inman,"° a similar mistake seems to
have occurred. The district court dismissed the information against the
defendant because he had been denied his constitutonal right to a
speedy trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed, "noting that it does not appear
denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977), in which it held that mass wildcat action of the union members
(absent, or in violation of, union orders) was not sufficient to hold the unions in civil contempt.
75. No. 76-1811 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 1978).
76. See also Groves v. Secretary of HEW, No. 76-1687 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 1978) (Secretary's
denial of disability benefits "not sustained by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole").
77. No. 77-2089 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 1978).
78. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
79. Id. at 310. One of the more intriguing ironies in the limited publication debate is that the
rule of Roseboro was first announced in an unpublished opinion. Daye v. Turner, No. 74-1153
(4th Cir. July 1, 1975). Daye was regarded as so important at the time that several district courts
began composing form letters to pro se prisoner litigants that informed them of their rights and
obligations under FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Fourth Circuit apparently recognized that it had
suppressed a law making opinion and remedied the problem by publishing Roseboro. Roseboro,
however, makes no reference to Daye.
80. No. 77-5256 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1978).
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that the District Judge founded his decision upon the controlling prece-
dent on the constitutional right to a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo...
or made findings of fact in relation to its four standards . *s"81 This
is a fundamental error; Barker v. Wingo82 is the central case on the
question and the district judge appears to have ignored it.
The argument that these cases should be published is strong. In
the first place they are not as rare as might be hoped.3 The bench and
the bar ought to know if and when such rudimentary errors are made.8 4
Litigation strategy may be influenced by the litigants' appraisal of the
judge's or the agency's likelihood of making an obvious mistake. Fur-
thermore, the present emphasis on governmental candor seems to re-
quire that the courts be the last branch to bury their mistakes.
81. Id.
82. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
83. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tennessee Valley Auth., No. 76-1841 (6th Cir. Feb. 17, 1978) (district
court failed to notice the absence of subject matter jurisdiction: "[t]his order should also represent
an admonition to the district court not to accept the parties' unsupported assertions that federal
jurisdiction exists in this, or any other, case."); Holoviak v. Califano, No. 77-3096 (6th Cir. Feb. 9,
1978) (district court entered a default judgment against the United States without requiring evi-
dence of claimant's entitlement-a direct violation of FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e)); Baskin v. Jago, No.
77-34 17 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1978) (district court treated a habeas corpus petition as though petitioner
had entered a guilty plea, which petitioner stated he had, when in fact the petitioner had been
found guilty in a trial to the court); United States v. Winstead, No. 77-1941 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1978)
(district court failed to comply literally with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11-the court did not "personally
inform" defendant of charges against him on the record).
84. A similar though distinguishable phenomenon can be discerned in the district courts'
treatment of summary judgment motions in prisoner civil rights cases. The problem, particularly
in the Fourth Circuit, seems not to be one of embarrassing error, but rather of silent revolt. The
Fourth Circuit has clearly articulated a strict standard for the granting of summary judgment.
There can, of course, be no dispute as to any material fact, and a further "inquiry into the facts
[must not be] desirable to clarify the application of the law." Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co.,
181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950). Moreover, the court has indicated that a dispute about infer-
ences from undisputed fact is sufficient to require denial of the motion:
Not merely must the historic facts be free of controversy but also there must be no con-
troversy as to the inferences to be drawn from them. It is often the case that although the
basic facts are not in dispute, the parties nevertheless disagree as to the inferences which
may properly be drawn. Under such circumstances, the case is not one to be decided on
a motion for summary judgment.
American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1965)
(citations omitted); see Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th
Cir. 1967). Furthermore, the court has held that the district courts should be especially reluctant
to grant summary judgment against a pro se prisoner litigant. Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583,
587 (4th Cir. 1976). Nevertheless, the district courts continue to grant summary judgment against
pro se prisoner civil rights litigants, and the Fourth Circuit continues to reverse-principally by
unpublished opinion. See, e.g., Jones v. Collins, No. 77-2233 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 1978); Easter v.
Zahradnick, No. 77-2323 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 1978); O'Connor v. Jarvis, No. 77-1559 (4th Cir. Jan. 17,
1978); Sykes v. Williams, No. 77-1531 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978). Speculation concerning why the
district courts and the circuit court cannot seem to agree on this matter is unnecessary; it seems
sufficient to conclude that this is not the sort of recurrent problem that should be submerged in
unpublished opinions.
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The most troublesome reversals in the sample were those that war-
ranted publication because they were controversial or novel. Indeed,
two decisions of the Sixth Circuit were sufficiently controversial to pro-
voke dissents,85 yet the opinions remained unreported.
The Sixth Circuit missed a significant opportunity to give guidance
to the district courts by failing to publish Moorer v. Gr,0in.8 6 In that
case, the appellant, a pro se prisoner litigant, failed to comply with rule
4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure by not filing notice of
appeal in the district court within thirty days of entry of judgment
against him. When notice of appeal was finally filed-about fifteen
days late-the district court denied appellant's motion for a certificate
of probable cause for the appeal. The Sixth Circuit indicated that rule
4(a) is "mandatory and jurisdictional";87 the court noted, however, that
rule 4(a) permits the district court to grant a thirty-day extension of the
time limit upon a showing of excusable neglect. It then held that the
district courts should not treat notices of appeal by pro se litigants as
untimely until the litigant has been advised of the permissible exten-
sion period under rule 4(a) and of the requirement of a showing of
excusable neglect.88 This rule is good law;89 it concerns a problem with
which district courts must deal regularly; there apparently is no pub-
lished Sixth Circuit case on point. Thus, Moorer is a clear-cut case of
suppressed precedent.
Examples of suppressed precedent appear among the Fourth Cir-
cuit's reversals as well. In Woodard v. Shannon," a prisoner civil rights
action, plaintiff sued his jailers, alleging "that they had circulated a
memorandum inaccurately describing petitioner as a security risk."'"
The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous. The Fourth
Circuit reversed, noting that plaintiff was apparently asserting "a con-
stitutional right to inspect his prison file on the ground that his due
process rights may have been violated by the inclusion of the misinfor-
85. See United States v. 150.89 Acres of Land, No. 76-1874 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 1978); Usery v.
Michigan Nat'l Bank, No. 76-2159 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978). See notes 98-122 infra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of separate opinions.
86. No. 77-3580 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 1978).
87. Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). This proposition is
well settled. Browder v. Director, 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
88. Moorer v. Griffin, No. 77-3580, at 4 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 1978) (citing Craig v. Garrison, 549
F.2d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 1977)).
89. Four other circuits have approved the rule. See Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306, 307 (4th
Cir. 1977); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 511 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1975); Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 501
F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bryant v. Elliott, 467 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1972).
90. No. 77-2112 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 1978).
91. Id. at 2.
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mation in his record." 92 The existence velnon of such a right is a con-
troversial and novel issue,93 one that should have been exposed to
scrutiny by publication. The issue is not entirely novel in the Fourth
Circuit, however; it was raised in Wilkins v. Fleshood,94 in which the
court enumerated the elements that a prisoner must prove to show the
deprivation claimed. The court in Shannon cited Wilkins to the district
court as the standard to use upon remand. But Wilkins also is unpub-
lished. The Fourth Circuit, then, has been confronted with a contro-
versial and novel issue that it has twice decided without issuing an
opinion for public consumption.
The original question 95 motivating the survey of reversals was
whether all reversals should be published, that is, whether the fact of
reversal should be added to the list of criteria for publication. A strong
case can be made for that addition. First, the total number of unpub-
lished reversals in both circuits has been low, so the added burden on
the court of preparing the extra opinions for publication will not be
large. Further, many of the reversals canvassed 96 did contain a great
deal of discussion and information that would have been useful to the
bench and bar. Finally, reversal as a criterion for publication has an
additional benefit--ease of application. While many of the present
standards are difficult to apply,9 7 it is easy to determine whether a case
has been reversed. In sum, a fairly strong argument can be made that
the circuits should add to their list of publication standards one requir-
ing publication of an opinion that reverses entirely or in part the dis-
trict court or administrative agency decision below.
D. Separate Opinions.
Examination of the role of separate opinions in our judicial sys-
tem98 leads to the hypothesis that few cases that generate separate opin-
ions will go unpublished. A concurring or dissenting opinion criticizes
92. Id. at 3.
93. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Minnesota, 554 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1977); State v. Rhodes, 54 Ohio St.
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 641 (1978). For a digest of recent cases, see CORRECTIONAL L. DIG. 1978 at 147
(F. Merritt ed. 1979).
94. No, 74-2214 (4th Cir. July 24, 1975).
95. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 77-94 supra.
97. Consider, for example, one of the Fourth Circuit's standards. 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(ii), pro-
vides for publication of an opinion if it "involves a legal issue of continuing public interest."
Determining whether an issue is of continuing public interest might be a good deal more difficult
than deciding how the court should rule on the issue.
98. See generally Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of
Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394 (1952); ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A
History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959).
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the position taken by the majority and asks for correction from those
with power to do so-a higher court, the Congress, or "the intelligence
of a later day." 99 If the criticism is not published, those with the power
to correct the mistake of the majority may remain unaware of the prob-
lem and thus not be impelled to action. We should, therefore, expect a
judge who writes a separate opinion to seek its publication in order to
vindicate his views. The expected publication of dissident views can
also be explained in terms of judicial dynamics; separate opinions are a
rare enough phenomenon on most courts °° so that the normal pattern
of collegiality will be disrupted only in publishable cases-"important"
ones-those significant enough to arouse a judge's "fighting convic-
tion."10 l
The hypothesis received strong support from the data produced by
our sample. Although neither circuit expressly provides for publication
in the event of a separate opinion, 1 2 the unpublished list of both cir-
cuits contained few opinions rendered by a divided court; only seven of
the four hundred cases in the sample contained a separate opinion.
Moreover, as Table VI illustrates, the frequency of dissidence was a
good deal higher among published than unpublished decisions.
TABLE VI
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Published Unpublished
Frequency Frequency
Total of Split on Total of Split on
Concurrence Dissent Opinions Court Concurrence Dissent Opinions Court
Fourth Circuit 2 8 45 22% 1 0 200 0.5%
Sixth Circuit 4 6 97 10% 2 4 200 3%
The important question here, as in the discussion of reversals, is
whether all opinions accompanied by a dissent or a concurrence should
be published. A careful look at the separate opinions in the sample
helps to answer the question. Some of the separate opinions reveal dis-
agreement over the present state of the law, thus clearly implicating the
99. The phrase is part of a comment on dissents by Chief Justice Stone: A dissent, he wrote,
"is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a later day . C.
HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
100. We know of no comprehensive data on frequency of separate opinions from the courts of
appeals. Only 5% of the 532 opinions in the study period contained one. Data from other courts,
along with a discussion of frequency of dissent, can be found in Reynolds, The Court of.ppeals of
Maryland- Roles, Work and Performance, 37 MD. L. REv. 1, 33 & n.148 (1977).
101. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 9 (1966).
102. The Ninth Circuit, however, does provide for publication if there is a separate opinion.
9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(6).
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court's law-declaring function. In Branham v. General Electric Co., 10 3
for example, the two sides split on whether the Tennessee statute of
limitations applied to a suit for injunctive as well as monetary relief
under the federal civil rights acts. The issue is important since the Ten-
nessee statute addresses itself specifically to the federal civil rights
acts;' 0 4 the question of injunctive relief comes up quite frequently and
is a matter of great public concern. Furthermore, the issue is a difficult
and novel one: the statute speaks of actions for "compensatory or pu-
nitive damages"'15 but does not mention injunctive relief. Finally, a
review of the available case law reveals no authority on the question. 0 6
Here was a case, then, that generated disagreement on an important,
novel, and potentially recurrent issue, yet that went unpublished. 07
Other separate opinions are valuable because of their probing crit-
icism of the current state of the decisional or statutory law. In United
States v. Battista,108 for example, the district court, following defend-
ant's conviction on an obscenity offense, set his bail at $12,500 and im-
posed the additional condition that defendant not distribute or be
associated with the distribution of any obscene literature. 0 9 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the order setting bail, but modified it by deleting the
additional condition. Judge Engel recognized in his thought-provoking
concurrence that the condition attached to defendant's release was not
permissible under the relevant statutes.' He found it anomalous,
103. No. 76-2471 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 1978).
104. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Cum. Supp. 1978). In most cases, of course, state stat-
utes of limitations do not provide directly for federal civil rights cases. Nevertheless, the federal
courts use the closest analogous state statute in determining the limitations period for civil rights
claims. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 489 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1973), a7'd, 421 U.S.
454 (1975).
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
106. The annotations to the Tennessee Code reveal no case that has treated the issue. Id.
Neither the majority nor the dissent cites any controlling precedent. Branham v. General Electric
Co., No. 76-2471 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 1978). As far as can be determined, the case was one of first
impression.
107. Another disagreement over the present state of the law, or perhaps the direction the law
should develop, occurred in Usery v. Michigan Nat'l Bank. No. 76-2159 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
The dispute in that case grew out of the Department of Labor's investigation of a sex discrimina-
tion complaint against the bank. In the course of discovery, the district court ordered the Secre-
tary to give the bank the names of all present and former employees of the bank who had given
information to the Secretary. On appeal, the majority reversed, citing Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet
Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977). Judge Merritt dissented. He read the treatment of the in-
former's privilege in Dunlop to be dictum and expressed a strong feeling that the court should be
reluctant to create any new evidentiary privileges or extend any old ones. Usery presents a clear
disagreement over the present state of the law, or at least over the direction in which the law
should develop.
108. No. 78-5008 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1978).
109. Id.
110. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148 (1976). Section 3146 indicates five permissible restrictions
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however, that a district judge "cannot, after a defendant has been con-
victed, impose as a condition of his freedom pending appeal a require-
ment that he refrain from the same type of conduct which brought
about his conviction . . ... "I The concurrence raises several troub-
ling questions: Are the federal bail statutes correct in directing the
judge's attention almost exclusively to the possibility of flight? Does
the exception for "danger to. . . the community""' include the kind
of danger obscene materials are thought to pose? Surely these serious
questions about the federal bail statutes should not have been sup-
pressed by nonpublication. Their exposure might have drawn the at-
tention of the Congress-those with the power to correct the problem.
A judge may dissent not because he disagrees about the state of the
law or about the merits of the law, but because he thinks the law has
been improperly applied. An example is Helm v. Mathews,"3 an ap-
peal from a denial of black lung benefits. 14 The majority affirmed on
the basis of the opinion below that the miner had been denied benefits
because his pulmonary dysfunction was not job related. The district
court and the majority reached this conclusion based upon the length
of time after the plaintiff left the mines before his symptoms began to
appear.I"5 Judge Edwards disagreed and cited "'the medically accepted
fact that pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease which advances with
age." "6 The mere fact that symptoms were delayed in appearing was
not sufficient, in his view, to overcome the administrative presump-
tion" 17 that the miner was disabled by pneumoconiosis. Judge Ed-
on a defendant's right to bail. All seem to be addressed to insuring his appearance at trial. Sec-
tion 3148 makes the conditions of section 3146 applicable to bail after defendant's conviction. It
also permits denial of release on bail when no condition will prevent the defendant's flight or
protect the community from the danger he poses.
111. United States v. Battista, No. 78-5008, at 3 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1978) (Engel, J., concurring).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976).
113. No. 76-2257 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1978). See also Kantor v. Dunn, No. 76-2165 (6th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1978). That case involved a complaint by a Jewish person that Saturday employment
testing violated her first amendment right to the free exercise of her religion. The district court
found that the burden on plaintiff was "minimal" and was counterbalanced by the state's substan-
tial administrative and financial interests. In dissent, Judge Merritt argued that the state's only
reason for failing to provide an alterntive testing date was "bureaucratic stubbornness-which is
.not a legitimate reason, much less the kind of 'compelling reason' required by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 2.
It is not clear whether the dispute in Kantor was over the standard to be applied, or over
whether that standard "had been satisfied." Perhaps that uncertainty is another argument for
publication of cases with separate opinions.
114. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1976).
115. No. 76-2257 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1978).
116. Id. at 2 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
117. Id. The presumption is triggered by pulmonary dysfunction tests and the miner's having
worked in the nation's coal mines for at least 15 years. 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(ii) (1978) (in-
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wards' disagreement is important; because this question of law
recurs 118 and is of great public interest in the region, disagreement on it
should be brought to the attention of the public.
Two cases in the sample, despite their separate opinions, can claim
no real legal significance or public interest. 1 9 Even these cases may
warrant publication, however; the separate opinion serves as a kind of
safety valve,12 0 permitting the dissenting judge to blow off steam.
While such opinions break no new ground, they do reveal the presence
of intellectual ferment and independent thought on the court.121 These
are phenomena that the bar and the public should be able to observe.
The results of the study suggest that it would be wise to require
publication in all cases in which there is a dissent or concurrence. Be-
cause the number of unpublished decisions with separate opinions is
small (in our sample at least), such a rule would cost little in terms of
judicial resources expended, yet would insure publication of a group of
opinions that in all likelihood should be available-to guide litigants
and planners, to provoke critical commentary, and to assure a forum
for any issue about which a judge feels strongly enough to dissent or
terim rule for claims filed before July 1, 1973, or for survivor where miner died before Jan. I,
1974). It can be rebutted only by "persuasive" evidence. Id. § 410.416.
118. See Table VII infra and text accompanying notes 127-28 infra for an indication of how
numerous black lung appeals are in the Sixth Circuit.
119. In United States v. 150.89 Acres of Land, No. 76-1874 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 1978), the ma-
jority granted a new trial in a condemnation case because of an uncorrected, unintentional error
by the government's expert witness. Judge Engel dissented on the ground that the district judge
had ample discretion to grant or deny the new trial motion. The law in this area is quite well
settled. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.18 (2d ed. 1977).
In United States v. McCartney, No. 76-1933 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 1978), the plaintiff asked that a
West Virginia Democratic primary election for Magistrate be set aside. The district court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The majority
affirmed, noting that "plaintiff does not recite or even allude to a single illegal practice, or federal
or state law violated, or refer to a single fact to support his claim." Id. at 2. Judge Haynsworth
concurred. He agreed that the complaint should have been dismissed, but thought that the proper
basis for the dismissal was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 3. One can only guess, but it
seems possible that Judge Haynsworth questioned the appropriateness of a dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the accepted rule for such a dismissal is
"that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citation omitted). Judge Haynsworth may
have relied on the conventional wisdom that the standards for pleading subject matter jurisdiction
are somewhat higher than those for pleading on the merits. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-
(2); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969) (compare § 1206 and
§ 1350 with §§ 1216-1220 and§§ 1356-1357).
120, See Stephens, supra note 98, at 398-401.
121. Cf. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 170 (D. Danelski & J.
Tulchia, eds., 1973) ("Justice Harlan was disturbed by the serenity of the Court and complained to
me that there were too few dissents.").
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E. Subject Matter Class//cation.
Subject matter classification of the published and unpublished
opinions in the sample produced some interesting, though not unpre-
dictable, results. They are summarized in Table VII.
TABLE VII
SUBJECT MATTER CLASSIFICATION OF FOURTH & SIXTH CIR-
CUIT PUBLISHED & UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
Fourth Circuit Sixth Circuit
Published Unpublished Published Unpublished
Total Cases 45 200 97 200
Total Criminal 6 26 27 57
Total Civil 39 174 70 143
Total U.S. Cases 16 26 30 63
U.S. Plaintiff 7 2 12 9
Contract actions I
Condem. of land I 2
Civil Rights 2
Fair Labor Standards Act I
Labor Mgt. Relations Act 1 2 10 2
Securities, Commodities, etc. I
Tax suit 2
Other 2 2 1
U.S. Defendant 9 24 18 54
Tort actions 3 1
Prisoner petitions:
Motions to vacate 6 8
Prisoner civil rights 2
Social Security I 4 2 16
Black lung I 5 15
Tax suits I I 5 1
All other 3 8 II II
Private Cases 23 146 40 78
Federal Question 19 135 32 57
Contract actions 2
Employer's Liability Act I I
Marine Injury 1 3 1
Other tort actions t 2
Civil Rights 3 4 12 19
Antitrust 2 1
Prisoner Petitions:
habeas corpus 5 51 3 17
prisoner civil rights 5 77 11
unclassified 2
Labor Mgt. Relations Act I
Patent I
Securities. Commodities, etc. 21
All other I 5 8
Diversity of Citizenship 4 II 8 21
Insurance I 2 4 6
Other contract actions 2 7 3 7
Real Property Action I
Personal injury (not auto) I 4
Other tort actions I 1 3
All other I
122. A rule requiring publication only when at least one judge believes it desirable is insuffi-
cient because the dissident may feel collegial pressure not to make his views public. Further, a
two-judge requirement provides a mechanism by which dissent can be stifled. See Musmanno v.
Eldredge, 382 Pa. 167, 114 A.2d 511 (1955), for an extreme example. Kurt Nadelmann, in
Nadelmann, The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (1959), traced the
history of the struggle to obtain the right to publish a dissent. After mentioning great Supreme
Court dissents, Nadelmann concluded: "Happily, views such as these have not been lost in the
secret of the Chambre du Conseil or buried in a secret Protokoll or file." Id. 432.
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Civil Unclassifiable 2 2
Total Criminal Cases 6 26 27 57Homicide 1Robbery (bank) 2 I 3 10Assault 1 2
Larceny & theft:
Interstate shipment
Trans. stolen prop. 2 3
Other I
Fraud:
Income tax 3
Mail IOther I 2Trans.-Forged Securities 2 1 2
Forgery 2 1
Counterfeiting
Narcotics:DAPCA narcotics I IDAPCA controlled sub. 2 3 6 2
Miscellaneous concern:
Extortion I 2
Gambling I I
Kidnapping IFirearms I 3 5 5Other I IFederal Statutes I 2Criminal Unclassifliable is 18
The overall unpublished to published ratio in the sample period is ap-
proximately four to one in the Fourth Circuit and two to one in the
Sixth Circuit. Subject matter classifications that vary significantly from
this ratio provoke inquiry and speculation.
The most striking deviation from the normal ratio occurs in pris-
oner cases, including federal and state habeas corpus petitions and fed-
eral and state civil rights complaints: the Fourth Circuit published ten
and left unpublished 134; the Sixth Circuit published three and left un-
published thirty-eight. 2 3 In each circuit the unpublished/published ra-
tio was, therefore, about thirteen to one-a wide deviation from the
normal ratio.'24 One possible explanation for this deviation is simply
that prisoner cases are (or at least are regarded by the judges as) repeti-
123. The Fourth Circuit total of 144 prisoner cases is significantly higher than that of the Sixth
Circuit-43. Those figures become more surprising with the realization that the Fourth Circuit
sample period was considerably shorter than the sample period for the Sixth Circuit. See note 38
.upra. A bit of research discloses, however, that this extraordinarily high number of prisoner
cases is typical for the Fourth Circuit. In 1977, for example, the total number of state prisoner
petition appeals filed in the United States Courts of Appeals was 1,650-406 of which (nearly
25%) came from the Fourth Circuit. See 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 174. There is no ready explana-
tion for this flood of prison litigation in the Fourth Circuit. The state prison population of the
Fourth Circuit is approximately the same as that of the Sixth, although the per capita incarcera-
tion rates of the Fourth Circuit states are higher than the corresponding rates of the Sixth Circuit
states.
124. It has been suggested that the use of unpublished opinions in prisoner cases poses serious
constitutional problems. The Chicago Council of Lawyers filed an Amicus Brief in Browder v.
Director, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), in which it argued that the Seventh Circuit's limited-publication
policy violated the first amendment and the right of equal access to and treatment by the courts.
Amicus argued that the effects of the plan were likely to be felt most acutely by indigent or pris-
oner litigants, or those geographically distant from the courts. The Supreme Court did not con-
sider any of these issues.
The sample provides some support for the equal access argument. The disproportionate
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tive and trivial. Several judges have remarked on "the absurdity of
invoking the full panoply of the federal judicial system in a dispute
regarding a prisoner's right to seven packages of cigarettes."' 25 A pos-
sible explanation for the perceived frivolity of these cases is the lack of
disincentives to appeal.126 Most prisoners proceed in forma pauperis
and pro se (although some have appointed counsel); once past the dis-
trict court, the prisoner appellant need make no additional investment
in money and very little additional investment in time. The sentiment
must therefore be, "why not appeal?" This situation is likely to pro-
duce many frivolous appeals, appeals that, according to all publication
plans, do not merit general dissemination. 27
Another category with a deviant ratio is social security (including
black lung) cases. Here the Fourth Circuit's ratio is almost typical-
9:2. The Sixth Circuit's ratio, however, is significantly above normal.
That court published two decisions in the area and left thirty-one un-
published to produce a ratio of 15:1 -significantly greater than the typ-
ical 2:1 ratio for the Sixth Circuit sample.
One possible explanation for both of these deviant ratios is that the
judges feel pressured in these kinds of cases. In each instance the
number of filings in the case category is high and has been the subject
of recent and dramatic increase.' 28 The flood of cases of a specific
type-particularly when that flood is a comparatively new phenome-
number of prisoner petitions that are unpublished means that the prisoner litigant has less law in
his field to rely on than does, say, the patent or tax litigant.
There is, however, an immediate problem with this argument. It may be that infrequent
publication of prison litigation aids the prisoner litigant rather than harming him. It may be, in
other words, that the cases that are published (and that may be cited) are the unusual cases in
which the prisoner has prevailed, while the cases that are unpublished are the typical ones in
which the prisoner's contentions either amount to no deprivation or are unprovable. This possi-
bility is one that could clearly be proved or disproved by empirical research.
For a more complete discussion of Browder and the constitutional argument, see Amicus
Brief, supra; Note, supra note 18.
125. Friendly, A verting the Flood, supra note 2, at 643; see Burger, Report on the Federal Judi-
cial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128 (1973).
126. See generally Note, Disincentives to Frivolous Appeals. An Evaluation of an ABA Task
Force Proposal, 64 U. VA. L. REV. 605 (1978).
127. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the "deviant" ratio in prisoner cases to that
observed in criminal appeals. Once again the criminal defendant often bears little of the cost of
his appeal, so economic disincentives to appeal are low. The sample data, however, show very
typical ratios in criminal appeals: 26:6 in the Fourth Circuit and 57:27 in the Sixth Circuit. In
both cases the unpublished ratio is almost exactly normal for each circuit-4:l and 2:1 respec-
tively. Almost all criminal defendants have counsel who can advise them on the pointlessness of
an appeal. Further, the positive incentives for appeal are often lower for them than for prisoner
litigants. Many convicted defendants are sentenced to probation or fines or very short prison
terms; for them, getting on with the business of life may be much more attractive than writ-
writing.
128. The Fourth Circuit is the national leader in prisoner petitions by a wide margin. See
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non-may push the judges toward the use of shortcuts.
Perhaps the most significant question to ask about deviant ratios is
whether the bare existence of the phenomenon should be a cause for
concern. In other words, should there be anxiety simply because some
kinds of cases get published much more frequently than do other
kinds? Karl Llewellyn argued that by asking the right questions and by
examining the court's efforts, the average lawyer could increase his pre-
dictive skills and decrease his cynicism considerably.
I submit that the average lawyer has only to shift his focus for a few
hours from "what was held" in a series of opinions to what those
opinions suggest or show about what was bothering and what was
helping the court as it decided.
.. . For the ordinary lawyer I submit that there can be no ques-
tion as to the gain in predictive power. Spend a single thoughtful
weekend with a couple of recent volumes of reports from your own
supreme court, read this way, and you can never again, with fervor
or despair, make that remark about never knowing where an appel-
late court will hang its hat.' 29
It is clear that if much of a court's product is suppressed and selectively
suppressed as to subject matter, this kind of exercise cannot be per-
formed. "What was bothering" the circuit courts was likely their exces-
sive workload-and perhaps particularly that segment of it that they
found unworthy of publication. So the deviant publica-
tion/nonpublication ratios do cause concern. They limit the ability of
the bar to examine systematically or even casually all of the court's
work to get some feel for its distribution across various subject matter
areas. To the extent, then,. that reckonability of result is aided by the
possibility of examining all or a representative sample of the court's
work, the existence in some areas of law of extremely deviant publica-
tion/nonpublication ratios is disturbing.
F. The Role of the Central Staff.
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Plans involve central staff130 in
the decisionmaking process.' 31 That involvement is particularly heavy
in the areas of pro se litigation, where the staff may recommend (in the
1977 ANNUAL REPORT 174. Prisoner litigation has shown a fairly steady increase in the circuit
courts in general. Id. 173. Social security appeals similarly have shown a significant rise. Id.
129. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 54, at 178-79.
130. "Central" staff is a group of law clerks, generally young and non-professional, who are
assigned to no individual judge, but instead perform tasks for the court as a whole. See generaly
JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 22, at 46-55; A.B.A. COMMISSION, supra note 54, at 96-99. A
detailed description of the involvement of staff in a state intermediate appellate court is given in
Lesinski & Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and Screening in the Michigan Court ofAppeals: One
Court'r Methodfor Increasing Judicial Productivity, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1211 (1973).
131. See generally CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFs, supra note 3.
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Fourth Circuit) that a case be decided by submission on brief rather
than oral argument, 32 and where (in both circuits) a draft opinion is
prepared by staff and circulated to the panel hearing the case.' 33
Heavy staff involvement of course saves a great deal of time. It
also reduces the possibility that the judges will give the case a fresh,
inquiring look;134 if the staff is competent, a judge may not be able to
challenge the correctness of the pigeonhole in which the staff has
placed the case. That possibility is further reduced if the court, when it
reviews the case, expects that the opinion will not be published. Hence,
the coincidence of overworked courts, substantial contribution of cen-
tral staff, and limited publication may lead to what Judge Robert
Thompson of the California Courts of Appeal has called the "no-
judge" decision.' 31
No outsider can know, of course, whether this is a real danger in
the circuit courts of appeal. We suspect from our knowledge, personal
and hearsay, of the judges on these courts that it is not. But the great
number of opinions that do not meet "minimum" standards 3 6 is a
source of significant concern, and at the very least does not foster confi-
dence that the court has taken a good hard look at the case at bar
before disposing of it.
III. A MODEL RULE
We have suggested several ways to minimize the dangers posed by
unpublished opinions, dangers both of suppressed precedent and of
withholding from the public information it should have concerning the
operation of the courts. At the same time the suggestions do not appear
132. Id.
133. [1971] FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ANN. REP. 17.
134. A perceptive practitioner has observed:
I am not sympathetic to the notion that we can identify the easy appellate cases, apriori,
then switch them to a track reserved for dull boxcars in order to make both room and
time on the mainline for the swift and shiny streamliners---the cases that are going to
make new law. It is doubtful to me that the system can identify the law-making deci-
sions before the opinions are written. The same judicial result can be reached by several
routes. It is often the route to decision selected rather than the destination reached which
is novel and law-making.
Statement of Robert E. Hinerfeld to the Advisory Committee for an Effective Publication Rule of
the Judicial Council of the State of California 24 (Nov. 2, 1978).
One student of the California system believes that reliance on central staff has led to bad
decisions in published opinions. Johnson, The Supreme Court of Cafornia 1975.76, Foreword-
The Accidental Decision and How It Happens, 65 CAL. L. REv. 231 (1977).
135. Thompson, Mitigating the Damage: One Judge and No Judge Appellate Decisions, 50
CAL. ST. B.J. 476 (1975).
136. See text accompanying notes 54-68 supra. The unpublished opinions often do not appear
well crafted. There are, for example, spelling mistakes. Although not very significant, they are
perhaps symbolic of uneven quality control.
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to undercut significantly the primary value of the limited publication
rules, conservation of judicial resources. These suggestions have been
incorporated into a model rule. Our model is a "conservative" one,
and in fact loosely based on our paradigm conservative rule, that of the
Fourth Circuit. 3 7 The conservative approach was chosen as the model
because we believe it best, when possible, to restrict the discretion of
judges. 138 In addition, a conservative rule has more potential for insur-
ing that all important cases are published, and we believe it best to err
on the side of insuring publication.
Rule -- OPINIONS 1
39
1. Minimum Standards:140
Every disposition will be accompanied by an opinion that suffi-
ciently states the facts of the case, its procedural stance and history,
and the relevant legal authority so that the basis for the disposition
can be understood from the opinion and the authority cited.
If the decision is based on the opinion below, sufficient portions
of that opinion should be incorporated into the opinion of this court
so that the basis for this court's disposition can be understood from a
reading of this court's opinion.
2. Publication of Opinions:
a. Criteria/or Publication: An opinion will be published if it:
(1) establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an
existing rule of law, or calls attention to an existing rule
of law which appears to have been generally over-
looked; 141
(2) applies an established rule of law to facts significantly
137. The Fourth Circuit approach is based, in turn, on the Model Rule found in STANDARDS.
See also the plans of the District of Columbia Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit.
These plans, also conservative, provided parts of our model rule; for individual citations, see notes
141-46 infra.
138. Some confession is perhaps in order here: we both believe that rules are useful and desir-
able devices for controlling judicial behavior. While we join the American realists in realizing
that rules are not the unique determinants of judicial action, neither of us is a complete "rule
skeptic."
139. The Model Rule does not mention the no-citation "corollary" to the limited publication
plans. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra. We have not addressed the impact of such rules
in this study because their impact is a function of the success of the limited publication plans.
That is, if all law making opinions were published there would be no need to cite unpublished
opinions to a court. If, on the other hand, significant numbers of important opinions went unpub-
lished, then the impact of the no-citation rule could be severe. Our views on the question of
citation are fully exposed in Reynolds & Richman.
140. This section of the Model Rule does not address directly the subject of publication.
Rather it concerns the writing of opinions. Its fairly strict standards reflect serious concern that the
excessively brief, conclusory opinion is an abdication ofjudicial responsibility. See text accompa-
nying notes 49-68 supra;, Reynolds & Richman 1173-76.
141. The first clause of this rule was included in the guidelines for opinion publication sug-
gested by the Federal Judicial Center. See STANDARDS 15. It has subsequently been included in
some variant form in several circuit plans. See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, supra note 18,
a; 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(i); 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(I)(i); 8TH CIR. R. app. 4(a); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(1).
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different from those in previous published applications
of the rule;142
(3) explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of existing de-
cisional or enacted law;143
(4) creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within
the circuit or between this circuit and another; 44
(5) concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of signifi-
cant public interest;
145
(6) is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion;
(7) reverses the decision below or affirms it upon different
grounds;
(8) addresses a lower court or administrative agency deci-
sion that has been published,' 46 or
(9) is an opinion in a disposition that
(a) has been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court, or
(b) is a remand of a case from the United States
Supreme Court. 147
b. Publication Decision: There shall be a presumption in
favor of publication. An opinion shall be published unless
each member of the panel deciding the case determines that
it fails to meet the criteria for publication.
c. Circulation and Availability of Unpublished Opinions:
(1) All unpublished opinions shall be part of the public
record.
(2) Unpublished opinions shall be circulated to the par-
ties, to all courts in this circuit, and to all depository
libraries in this circuit. Upon payment of a reasonable
fee, others may either purchase individual opinions or
subscribe on a continuing basis.
The last clause, the resurrection rule, seems to be the unique property of the Ninth Circuit. 9TH
CIR. R_ 21 (b)(2).
142. Similar provisions are contained in the plans of the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Eighth Circuit. See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, supra note 19, e; 8TH CIR. R. app. I 4(c).
143. Similar provisions are included in the plans of the District of Columbia Circuit, the
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, supra note 19, c,
4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(iii); 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(l)(iii); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(3).
144. See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, supra note 19, d; 4TH Cia. P. 18 (a)(v); 7TH CIR.
R. 35(c)(l)(iv)(C); 8TH CIR. R. app. 4(f); 10TH CIa. K. 17(d)(1).
145. Similar provisions are included in the plans of several circuits. See District of Columbia
Circuit Plan, supra note 19, (b); 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(ii); 7TH CIa. R. 35(c)(l)(ii); 8Tm CI. R. app.
4(d); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(4).
146. For similar provisions, see 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(vi); Sixth Circuit Plan, supra note 19, (1);
7TH CIa. R. 35(c)(l)(v); 8TH CIa. R. app. 4(e); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(5).
147. This provision is surely a desirable one. A case that has generated a full United States
Supreme Court opinion clearly should be published at the circuit court level--even if the publica-
tion order is retroactive. A circuit court opinion following a remand from the Supreme Court
should also be published. Even if the opinion is simply a reference back to the district court, the
public should have ready access to the entire record of every Supreme Court case. See Comment,
supra note 13.
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Most of the provisions of the Model Rule are explained in the
notes 48 and cross-referenced to existing rules. Several sections warrant
more extended discussion. Perhaps the most novel suggestion is to in-
clude in the Model Rule minimum standards for the writing of opin-
ions. The need for this provision is amply demonstrated by the study:
between twenty and thirty percent of the opinions reviewed arguably
did not satisfy minimum standards. 49
Sections 2(a)(7) and (8) are also new. The study suggests that a
rule requiring publication of all reversals and all cases generating mul-
tiple opinions is a useful prophylactic device. 50 These opinions are
likely to be interesting; they are few and easily identified.
Section 2(b) of the Model Rule provides for a presumption infavor
of publication, while most existing court rules provide for an opposite
presumption. The point of this change is simply that before an opinion
is suppressed, the members of the panel should have to address directly
and answer in the negative the question of its importance. Opinions
should not be suppressed by default. This section also requires a unan-
imous decision in order not to publish.
Finally, section 2(c) of the Model Rule calls for full circulation of
unpublished opinions.'' The aim here is to minimize the possibility
that nonpublication plans will create two classses of litigants and law-
yers-those with access only to published opinions, and the habitual
litigant or his counsel who knows the entire product of the court.
No rule can insure perfection; under any nonpublication scheme,
some precedent will be lost, and some poor quality judicial work will
slip through. Nevertheless, a well-framed rule can focus the court's at-
tention on its difficult task-maximization of judicial efficiency without
a concomitant loss in judicial responsibility and accountability. The
proposed Model Rule will, it is hoped, help the courts meet the chal-
lenge.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our study of two circuits' experience with limited publication has
been the first systematic attempt to evaluate the product of those plans.
We have addressed a number of discrete questions concerning the op-
eration of the plans, inquiries that led us to make several suggestions to
correct perceived malfunctions. In addition, we posited a hypothesis
148. See notes 139-47 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 54-66 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 95-122 supra. The suggestion that all multiple opinion cases
warrant publication is not new. See 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(6).
151. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
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involving a radical/conservative dichotomy to be tested in the course of
looking at those questions. We have found little to suggest that the
dichotomy is valid, at least for these two courts. Still we believe-as
witnessed by our Model Rule-that a conservative rule will more likely
insure that the problem of suppressed precedent does not become a
serious one.1
52
Previous commentary on limited publication focused on the prob-
lem of suppressed precedent-law making decisions that were not be-
ing published15 3-not a significant problem in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit courts. The panels typically follow their own rules, 5 4 and few
opinions in our sample contained material that should have been made
public. In addition, feasible methods exist, as we have suggested, for
insuring publication of many opinions that should be published but
that at present are not.
This study, however, did uncover a serious problem. The unpub-
fished opinions as they are written contain little that conceivably would
be of interest to anyone other than litigants. The key phrase in that
observation is "as they are written." What cannot be ascertained from
the opinions is whether they could have been interesting. In other
words, the case may have contained material from which new law
could have been made (or old law reexamined, or an old precedent
rediscovered), but the court declined the opportunity to do so. The
presence of so many "opinions that do not opine" '  may reflect a
growing tendency to make the courts into the antithesis of what we
expect, to make them into a bureaucracy where decisions are routine
and the prime goal is to shuffle paper. That is a danger that must be
guarded against with vigilance. A court must continually be alert to
new pressures, responsive to changing needs, if it is to carry out its
mandate of justice under law.
We could not determine from our examination the extent of "lost"
precedent-to do so properly would require an extraordinary immer-
sion in the jurisprudence of the circuits and the record of each case. It
is only when that job is done, however, that the true price paid for
limited publication can be learned, and a proper accounting of the costs
and benefits of limited publication made.
152. Most draftsmen of models in this area have chosen conservative rules. See, e.g., STAN-
DARDS.
153. See, e.g., note 13 supra and authorities cited therein; Reynolds & Richman 1192 nn. 128-
29 and authorities cited therein.
154. One problem, not mentioned elsewhere in this Article, is the occasional failure of a court
to follow its own rule prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Woodard v. Shan-
non, No. 77-2112 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
155. The phrase is from Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1957).
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